Abstract. Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs have been investigated in two models: the Public Parameter model and the Secret Parameter model. In the former, a public string is "ideally" chosen according to some efficiently samplable distribution and made available to both the Prover and Verifier. In the latter, the parties instead obtain correlated (possibly different) private strings. To add further choice, the definition of zero-knowledge in these settings can either be non-adaptive or adaptive. In this paper, we obtain several unconditional characterizations of computational, statistical and perfect NIZK for all combinations of these settings. Specifically, we show:
is, a single message from the Prover to the Verifier-some setup assumptions are provably necessary [GO94] . These setup assumptions can be divided into two groups:
1. Public Parameter Setup. The originally proposed setup is the Common Random String Model in which a uniformly random string is made available to both the Prover and Verifier. Many NIZK schemes have been implemented in this model [SMP87, BFM88, FLS90, DMP88, BDMP91, KP98, DCO + 01]. A slight relaxation of this model is the Public Parameter model, also known as the Common Reference String Model, in which a string is "ideally" chosen according to some polynomial-time samplable distribution and made available to both the Prover and Verifier. Such a setup can be used to select -say-safe primes, group parameters, or public keys for encryption schemes, etc. See for example [Dam00, CLOS02] . 2. Secret Parameter Setup. Cramer and Damgård [CD04] explicitly introduce the Secret Parameter setup model in which the Prover and Verifier obtain correlated (possibly different) private information. More generally, the secret parameter model encompasses the Pre-processing Model in which the Prover and Verifier engage in an arbitrary interactive protocol, at the end of which, both Prover and Verifier receive a private output. (This follows because any arbitrary protocol for pre-processing can be viewed as a polynomial-time sampler from a well-defined distribution.) Such a setup model is studied in [KMO89, DMP88, Dam93] .
The above setup models can be implemented in a variety of ways, which may or may not require their own independent assumptions (For example, secure two-party computations protocols can be used to pick a random string.) In this paper we defer the discussion of how trusted setups are implemented, and choose instead to focus on the relative power of the models.
We restrict our study to the simplest setting in which only a single theorem is proven. Also, we consider security against unbounded provers. (That is, we consider proof systems as opposed to argument systems.) Following similar studies in the interactive setting -see for example [Vad99, SV03, Vad04] -we allow the honest prover algorithm to be inefficient (although some of our constructions have efficient prover algorithm for languages in NP).
Our investigation also considers both adaptive and non-adaptive definitions of zero-knowledge for non-interactive proofs. Briefly, the difference between these two is that the adaptive variant guarantees that the zero-knowledge property holds even if the theorem statement is chosen after the trusted setup has finished, whereas the non-adaptive variant does not provide this guarantee.
Our Results
Secret Parameter Model One suspects that the secret-parameter setup is more powerful than its public-parameter counterpart. Indeed, in game theory, a well-known result due to Aumann [Aum74] states that players having access to correlated secret strings can achieve a larger class of equilibria, and in particular, better payoffs, than if they only share a common public string. As we shall see, this intuition carries over in a strong way to the cryptographic setting. But first, we show that, Informal Theorem [Upper bound] In the secret parameter model, noninteractive perfect zero-knowledge proofs exist unconditionally for all languages in AM.
This result is obtained by combining the work of [FLS90] with an adaptation of Kilian's work on implementing commitments using oblivious transfer [Kil88] .
Previously, for general NP languages, only computational NIZK proof systems were known in the secret-parameter setup model [DMP88, FLS90, KMO89, DFN05] . Furthermore, these systems relied on various computational assumptions, such as the existence of one-way permutations. Recently, Cramer and Damgård [CD04] constructed statistical NIZK proofs in this model for specific languages related to discrete logarithms. (On the other hand, their results apply to an unbounded number of proofs, whereas ours do not.)
As a corollary of our result, we obtain a complete characterization of computational, statistical and perfect NIZK in the secret parameter model. Namely, we show that NIP = NIZK = NISZK = NIPZK = AM, where NIP denotes the class of languages having non-interactive proofs, and NIZK, NISZK and NIPZK denotes the classes of languages having non-interactive computational, statistical and perfect zero-knowledge proofs.
Public Parameter Model: Statistical NIZK We next turn our attention to the public parameter model, and show that, in contrast to the Secret Parameter model, statistical NIZK proofs for NP-complete languages are unlikely to exist. Previously, Aiello and Håstad [AH91] showed a similar type of lower bound for interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Although their results extend to the case of NIZK in the common random string model, they do not extend to the general public parameter model.Informal Theorem [Lower bound] Non-interactive statistical adaptive zeroknowledge proof systems only exist for languages in BPP/1 (i.e., the class of languages decidable in probabilistic polynomial time with one bit of advice, which depends only on the length of the instance).
By an argument of Adleman, this in particular means that all languages which have statistical adaptive NIZK in the public-parameter model can be decided by polynomial-sized circuits.
We note that a similar strengthening for the non-adaptive case is unlikely, as statistical non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems for languages which are conjectured to be "hard" are known (e.g., see [GMR98] Informal Theorem [Lower bound] The existence of computational NIZK systems in the public parameter model for a hard-on-average language implies the existence of (non-uniform) one-way functions.
Our upper bound, which applies to the stronger adaptive definition, improves on the construction of Feige, Lapidot, and Shamir [FLS90] which uses one-way permutations (albeit in the common random string model, whereas our construction requires a public parameter). Our lower bound, which applies to the weaker non-adaptive definition, was only known for interactive zero-knowledge proofs [OW93] . We therefore present a (quite) different and relatively simple direct proof for the case of NIZK in the public parameter model.
As a final point, by combining our last two theorems, we obtain the following unconditional characterization of computational NIZK proofs in the public parameter model:
Either NIZK proofs exist only for "easy" languages (i.e., languages that are not hard-on-average), or NIZK proofs exist unconditionally for every language in AM (i.e., for every language which admits a non-interactive proof ).
This type of "all-or-nothing" property was known for interactive zero-knowledge proofs, but not for NIZK since prior constructions of NIZK relied on one-way permutations.
Additional Contributions As already mentioned, some proofs in this paper extend previously known results for interactive zero-knowledge proofs to the non-interactive setting. We emphasize that our proofs are not mere adaptations of prior results -indeed the results of Aiello and Håstad and of Ostrovsky and Wigderson are complicated and technically challenging. In contrast, in the noninteractive setting, we obtain equivalent results in a much simpler way. This suggests the use of non-interactive zero-knowledge as a "test-bed" for understanding the (seemingly) more complicated setting of interactive zero-knowledge.
Other Related Work
In terms of understanding NIZK, two prior works, [DCPY98] and [GSV99] , offer complete problems for non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge. Both of these works apply to the non-adaptive definition and only the common random string model. We emphasize that these results do not directly extend to the more general public parameter model. In particular, complete problems for NISZK in the public parameter model are not known (see the remarks following Thm. 4).
As mentioned earlier, many prior works, e.g. [AH91, Oka96, SV03, GV98, Vad99], address the problem of obtaining unconditional characterizations of statistical zero-knowledge in the interactive setting. More recently, Vadhan [Vad04] also obtains unconditional characterizations of computational zero-knowledge.
Open Questions While our NIZK proof system in the secret parameter model has an efficient prover strategy, our proof system in the public parameter model does not. Indeed, resolving whether one-way functions suffice for efficient-prover NIZK systems is a long-standing open question with many important implications. A positive answer to this question would, for example, lead to the construction of CCA2-secure encryption schemes from any semantically-secure encryption scheme.
Definitions
We use standard notation for probabilistic experiments introduced in [GMR85] , and abbreviate probabilistic polynomial time as p.p.t.
Non-interactive Proofs in the Trusted Setup model
In the trusted setup model, every non-interactive proof system has an associated distribution D over binary strings of the form (s V , s P ). During a setup phase, a trusted party samples from D and privately hands the Prover s P and the Verifier s V . The Prover and Verifier then use their respective values during the proof phase. We emphasize that our definition only models single-theorem proof systems (i.e., after setup, only one theorem of a fixed size can be proven).
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Definition 1 (Non-Interactive Proofs in the Secret/Public Parameter Model). A triple of algorithms, (D, P, V ), is called a non-interactive proof system in the secret parameter model for a language L if the algorithm D is probabilistic polynomial-time, the algorithm V is a deterministic polynomial-time and there exists a negligible function µ such that the following two conditions hold:
If D is such that s V is always equal to s P then we say that (D, P, V ) is in the public parameter model.
Remark 1. In our definition, as with the original one in [BFM88] , the Verifier is modeled by a deterministic polynomial time machine. By a standard argument due to Babai and Moran [BM88] , this choice is without loss of generality since a probabilistic Verifier can be made to run deterministically through repetition and the embedding of the Verifier's random coins in the setup information.
Let NIP denote the class of languages having non-interactive proof systems. For the rest of this paper, we distinguish the secret parameter model from the public parameter model using the superscripts sec and pub respectively. We start by observing that NIP pub and NIP sec are equivalent. The proof appears in the full version.
Zero Knowledge
We next introduce non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. In the original nonadaptive definition of zero-knowledge from [BFM88] , there is one simulator, which, after seeing the statement to be proven, generates both the public string and the proof at the same time. In a later adaptive definition from [FLS90] , there are two simulators-the first of which must output a string before seeing any theorems. The stronger adaptive definition guarantees zero-knowledge even when the statements are chosen after the trusted setup has finished. 6 Here, we choose to present a weaker (and simpler) adaptive definition similar to the one used in [CD04] . The main reasons for this choice are that (a) a weaker definition only strengthens our lower bounds and (b) our definition is meaningful also for languages outside of NP, whereas the definitions of [FLS90, Gol04] only apply to languages in NP. Nevertheless, we mention that for languages in NP, our upper bounds (and of course the lower bounds) also hold for the stricter adaptive definitions of [FLS90, Gol04] .
Definition 2 (Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge in the Secret/Public Parameter Model). Let (D, P, V ) be an non-interactive proof system in the secret (public) parameter model for the language L. We say that (D, P, V ) is nonadaptively zero-knowledge in the secret (public) parameter model if there exists a p.p.t. simulator S such that the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable by polynomial-sized circuits (when the distinguishing gap is a function of |x|)
We say that (D, P, V ) is adaptively zero-knowledge in the secret (public) parameter model if there exists two p.p.t. simulators S 1 , S 2 such that the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable by polynomial-sized circuits.
We furthermore say that (D, P, V ) is perfect (statistical) zero-knowledge if the above ensembles are identically distributed (statistically close).
For notation purposes, we will use NIZK, NISZK, and NIPZK to denote the class of languages having computational, statistical, and perfect non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems respectively.
The Hidden Bits Model
In order to prove our main theorems, we first review the "hidden bits" model described in [FLS90] . In this model, the Prover and Verifier share a hidden string R, which only the Prover can access. Additionally, the Prover can selectively reveal to the Verifier any portion of the string R. Informally, a proof in the hidden bits model consists of a triplet (π, R I , I) where I is a sequence of indicies, I ⊆ {1, 2, ..., |R|} representing the portion of R that the prover wishes to reveal to the verifier, R I is the substring of R indexed by I, and π is a proof string. For a formal definition of this model, see Goldreich [Gol01] from which we borrow notation.
The following theorem is shown by Feige, Lapidot and Shamir.
Theorem 1 ([FLS90]
). There exists a non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof system in the hidden bits model for any language in NP.
We extend their result to any language in AM by using the standard technique of transforming an AM proof into the NP statement that "there exists a short Prover message which convinces the polynomial-time Verifier." Theorem 2. There exists a non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof system in the hidden bits model for any language in AM.
Looking ahead, in Sect. 4 we extend Thm. 2 to show that the class of noninteractive perfect zero-knowledge proofs in the hidden bits model is in fact equivalent to AM.
Feige, Lapidot and Shamir show how to implement the hidden-bits model with a one-way permutation in the public parameter model. Their implementation, however, degrades the quality of zero-knowledge -in particular, the resulting protocol is only computational zero-knowledge. Below, we show how to avoid this degradation in the secret parameter model. Lemma 2. Let (P, V ) be a non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof system for the language L in the hidden bits model. Then, there exists a non-interactive perfect adaptive zero-knowledge proof system (P , V ) for the language L in the secret parameter model. Furthermore if, (P, V ) has an efficient prover, then (P , V ) has one as well.
Proof Sketch. We implement the hidden bits model by providing the Prover and Verifier correlated information about each bit of the hidden string. In particular, each bit is split into shares using a simple secret sharing scheme. The Prover is given all of the shares, while the Verifier is only given a random subset of them (which is unknown to the Prover). This is done in such a way that the Verifier has no information about the bit, but nonetheless, the Prover cannot reveal the bit in two different ways except with exponentially small probability. We note that this technique is reminiscent to the one used in [Kil88] to obtain commitments from oblivious transfer and to the one in [KMO89] to obtain NIZK with pre-processing (we remark that their resulting NIZK still requires additional computational assumptions, even when ignoring the assumptions necessary for their pre-processing). Our protocol is described in Fig. 1 and a complete proof is given in the full version.
Armed with this Lemma, we can now prove our main theorem concerning non-interactive zero-knowledge in the secret parameter model. Related Characterizations We note that Lemma 2 also gives an upper bound on the class of perfect zero-knowledge proofs in the hidden bits model. As a corollary, we obtain the following characterization. 
The Non-Adaptive Case
In analogy with the result by [AH91] for interactive zero-knowledge, we show that only languages in the intersection of AM and coAM have statistical NIZK proof systems in the public parameter model. Proof Sketch. Let (D, P, V ) be a statistical NIZK proof system in the public parameter for the language L with simulator S. We show that L ∈ AM and that L ∈ coAM. The former statement follows directly from Lemma 1. To prove the latter one, we present a two-round proof system for proving x / ∈ L. (Note that by the results of [GS86, BM88] it is sufficient to present a two-round private coin proof system.)
Verifier Challenge:
1. Run the simulator (σ0, π ) ← S(x) and the sampling algorithm σ1 ← D(1 |x| ) to generate public parameter strings σ0 and σ1. 2. Run V on input (σ0, π ) to check if the honest verifier accepts the simulated proof. If V rejects, then output "accept" and halt. 3. Otherwise, flip a coin b ∈ 0, 1 and send α = σ b to the prover. The Prover response:
1. Upon receiving an input string α, check if there exists a proof π which the honest verifier V accepts (i.e., V (x, α, π) = 1). 2. If so, output β = 0; otherwise, output β = 1. The Verifier acceptance condition:
1. Upon receiving string β, output "accept" if β = b, and reject otherwise.
Completeness We show that if x / ∈ L, then the Prover (almost) always convinces the Verifier. If the Verifier sent the string σ 0 , the Prover always responds with β = 0, which makes the Verifier always accept. This follows since the Verifier only sends σ 0 if the simulated proof was accepting, which implies that there is at least one accepting proof of x ∈ L for (P, V ). If the Verifier sent the string σ 1 , then by the soundness of (P, V ), the probability (over the coins of the Verifier) that there exists a proof for x ∈ L is negligible. Therefore, except with negligible probability, the Prover responds with β = 1 and the Verifier accepts.
Soundness Intuitively, this protocol relies on the same logic as the graph nonisomorphism protocol. If x ∈ L, then the (exponential time) Prover cannot distinguish whether α was generated by the simulator or by the sampler D, and therefore can only convince the Verifier with probability 1/2. This follows from the statistical zero-knowledge property of (P, V ). It only remains to show that the probability (over the random coins of the Verifier) that the Verifier accepts statements x ∈ L in step (2), without further interaction, is negligible. This follows from the zero-knowledge (and completeness) property of (P, V ). Otherwise, V would distinguish between simulated proofs and real ones (since by completeness, the honest prover P succeeds with high probability.) Remark 2. Using techniques from the proof of Thm. 4, one can show that the class NISZK pub reduces to the problem of Statistical Difference, which is complete for SZK [SV03] 7 . Thus, an alternative way to prove this theorem would be to present such a reduction and then invoke the results of [AH91].
The Adaptive Case
In this section we sharpen our results from the previous section when instead considering the adaptive variant of zero-knowledge.
Theorem 5. If L has a non-interactive adaptive statistical zero-knowledge proof in the public parameter model, then L ⊂ BPP/1.
Proof Sketch. Let (D, P, V ) be a non-interactive adaptive statistical zeroknowledge proof system for L with simulators S 1 and S 2 .
We first observe that by the statistical zero-knowledge property, for every n for which L contains an instance of length n, the output of S 1 (1 n ) must be statistically close to the output of D(1 n ). This follows because the output of S 1 (1 n ) is independent of the theorem statement. This observation suggests the following probabilistic polynomial time decision procedure D(x) for L, which obtains a one-bit non-uniform advice indicating whether L contains any instances of length |x|.
On input an instance x, 1. If the non-uniform advice indicates that L contains no instances of length |x|, directly reject. 2. Otherwise, run (σ , aux) ← S 1 (1 |x| ) to generate a public parameter. 3. Run π ← S 2 (x, aux) to produce a putative proof. 4. Run V (x, σ , π ) and accept iff V accepts.
Note that when x ∈ L, then D accepts with overwhelming probability due to the completeness and zero-knowledge property of (D, P, V ). If x / ∈ L and there are no instances of length |x| in L, then D always rejects due to the non-uniform advice. It remains to show that when x / ∈ L, and there exists instances of length |x| in L, then D rejects with high probability.
Assume, for sake of reaching contradiction, that there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for infinitely many lengths n, L contains instances of length n yet there exists an instance x / ∈ L of length n, such that
We show how this contradicts the fact that the output of S 1 and D are statistically close (when L contains instances of length n). By the soundness of (D, P, V ), there exists a negligible function µ such that for any unbounded prover P * ,
Consider an exponential time non-uniform distinguisher C, which on input σ (and advice x), enumerates all proof strings π to determine if any of them convince V to accept x. If so, C outputs 0, and otherwise outputs 1. If σ is generated by S 1 , then by (1), such a proof string π exists with noticeable probability. On the other hand, if σ comes from D, then by (2), such a proof string only exists with negligible probability. We conclude that C distinguishes the output of S 1 from that of D with a non-negligible advantage.
In this section we show that one-way functions are sufficient and necessary for computational NIZK for languages that are hard-on-average. Combining these two results, we obtain the following unconditional characterization : Either NIZK pub only contains "easy" languages (i.e., languages that are not hard-onaverage), or it "hits the roof ", (i.e., contains all of AM).
Preliminaries Let us first define one-way functions and hard-on-average languages. As is standard in the context of zero-knowledge proofs, we define hardness in terms of infeasability for non-uniform p.p.t.
Definition 3 (One-way function). A function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * is called one-way if the following two conditions hold:
-Easy to compute: There exists a (deterministic) polynomial-time algorithm E such that on input x, E outputs f (x). -Hard to invert: For every non-uniform p.p.t. algorithm A, every sufficiently large integer n, and every polynomial p(·),
Definition 4 (Hard-on-average language). A language L is hard-on-average if there exists a p.p.t. sampling algorithm G such that for every non-uniform p.p.t. algorithm A, every polynomial p(·), and every sufficiently large n,
OWFs are Sufficient
We show how to implement the hidden bits model in the public-parameter model based on a one-way function. Recall that [FLS90] implements the hidden bits model using a one-way permutation and a hard-core predicate. The reason for using a one-way permutation is to give the Prover a short certificate for opening each bit in only one way (the certificate being the pre-image of the one-way permutation). A similar technique fails with one-way functions since a string may have either zero or many pre-images, and therefore a malicious Prover may be able to open some hidden bits as either zero or one.
Another approach would be to use a one-way function in order to construct a pseudo-random generator [HILL99] , and then to represent a 0 value as a pseudorandom string and a 1 as a truly random string (in some sense, this technique is reminiscent of the one used by Naor for bit commitment schemes from pseudorandom generators [Nao91] ). The Prover can thus open a 0 value by revealing a seed to the pseudo-random string. However, there is no way for the Prover to convince a Verifier that a string is truly random.
We overcome this problem by forming a reference string consisting of pairs of 2k-bit strings, (α, β) in which exactly one of the two strings is pseudo-random while the other is truly random. More precisely, the 0-value is encoded as a pair in which α is generated pseudo-randomly by expanding a k bit seed into a 2k bit string, while β is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}
2k . The 1-value is encoded the opposite way: α is chosen randomly, while β is generated pseudorandomly. The Prover can now reveal a 0 or a 1 by revealing the seed for either α or β.
Lemma 3. Assume the existence of one-way functions. Let (P, V ) be a noninteractive (adaptive) zero-knowledge proof system for the language L ∈ NP in the hidden bits model. If P is an efficient prover, then, there exists a noninteractive (adaptive) zero-knowledge proof system (P , V ) for the language L in the public parameter model. Proof Sketch. Let (P, V ) be an NIZK proof system in the hidden bits model, let G : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} 2k be a pseudo-random generator and let L ∈ NP be a language with witness relation R L . Consider protocol (P , V ) described in Fig. 2 .
Completeness Completeness follows from the corresponding completeness of (P, V ) and the fact that P aborts only with negligible probability.
Soundness Assume for the moment that a cheating prover P * is only able to open R in one manner. In this case, the soundness of (P, V ) carries over to (P , V ) in the same way as in Lemma 2. All that remains is to show that R can only be opened in one way. Below, we argue that this happens with high probability.
Note that there are a maximum of 2 n pseudo-random strings in G's support. On the other hand, there are 2 2n strings of length 2n. Therefore, a randomly sampled length-2n string will be pseudo-random with probability at most 2 −n . Thus, for any pair (a i , b i ), the probability that both values are pseudo-random is at most 2 −n . By the union bound, the probability that there is one such pair in s is upper-bounded by n2 −n .
Zero-knowledge We present a simulator S = S 1 , S 2 for (D, P , V ) which uses the simulator S for (P, V ) as a subroutine. First, (s, aux) ← S 1 (1 n ) generates s as a sequence of pairs (α i , β i ) in which both α i and β i are pseudo-random. The aux value contains all of the seeds, u i , w i , for the pseudo-random values α i and β i respectively. The simulator S 2 works by running simulator S(x) to generate (π , R I , I) ← S(x) and then outputting (π , R I , I, {v i | i ∈ I}) where v i equals u i if r i = 0 and w i otherwise. In order to show the validity of the simulation, consider the following four hybrid distributions.
-Let H 1 denote the ensemble (s, π) in which the honest Prover runs on a string s generated according to D. -Let H 2 denote the output of the above experiment with the exception that D provides all pre-images {v i } to an efficient prover algorithm P eff , which also
